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1.0 Introduction 
________________________________________________________________________ 
This chapter presents the background and problem discussion providing the basis from 
which the purpose of the study is built and the research questions defined. Delimitations 
and a short thesis outline are also presented. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
1.1 Background 
The recent global financial crisis was an economic shock that surprised companies and 
countries alike with its swiftness and pervasiveness across all economies and sectors. The 
prediction of such events is certainly not an exact science and is perhaps summed by a 
simple statement expressed by Paul Samuelson, ‘Wall Street indices predicted nine out of 
the last five recessions!’ The meteoric growth rates experienced in the late 2000s 
suddenly, quickly and broadly came to a crashing halt and the global economy plunged 
into a rapid decline. The longest recession since WW2, the global financial crisis (GFC) 
presents a somewhat purist setting to analyse the impact of an extreme trough in that its 
source was from the financial sector and impacted across all major industries. This event 
presented companies with high financial constraint and high cash flow volatility. This is a 
scenario which, according to theory and research, lends to an importance of internal 
financing capacity or namely cash. The reduction in access to external money markets 
ensured cash as a hot topic of debate, just how important would it be to be able to 
internally finance projects, that is, how important a financial position of large excess cash 
holdings impact upon the value creating ability of a firm. The media was rife with where 
investors should look for gains and certainly firms that were cashed up were singled out 
as worthy entities. Deloitte 2011, made the following statement: 
‘The global financial crisis has simultaneously increased the cost of credit and constrained its 
availability. This tightening makes cash management — and preservation — much more 
critical... reducing risk, controlling costs and preserving cash are critical in this new 
environment... For instance, if disbursements aren’t necessary or protective, they shouldn’t be 
paid out. Cash remains king. Companies that maximize their cash positions and minimize 
debt are better protected than more highly leveraged firms.’ 
Cash is a topic that by its nature falls into many financial categories of discussion. It 
is the hope of the authors that this paper will not only provide a sound discursive 
and empirical analysis but open the door for further research within the field. This 
paper will explore the importance of cash, namely excess cash holdings, from the 
shareholder’s perspective and aim to provide a comprehensive overview of the topic 
and a solid base from which further research can be built from. 
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1.2 Problem Discussion 
Keynes first postulated in 1936 that one would hold onto cash as long the marginal 
benefits outweighed the marginal costs. Keynes (1936) stated that, ‘there is no necessity 
to hold idle cash to bridge over intervals if it can be obtained without difficulty at the 
moment when it is actually required.’ In a Miller and Modigliani (M&M) world, 
according to irrelevance theory, firm capital structure is irrelevant given the assumptions: 
(1) Neutral taxes; (2) No capital market restrictions; (3) Symmetric access the capital 
markets; and (4) Firm’s financial policy reveals no information. In the real world, 
however, market frictions exist that can both be exploited and also place factors on a firm 
that demand appropriate planning and strategy. Keynes statement has two important 
elements, “obtained without difficulty” and “at the moment when it is actually required.” 
The former is perceived by the authors to relate to if a company is either constrained or 
unconstrained and the latter statement to timing. The inability to predict a crisis is 
exemplified by the suddenness and pervasiveness of the GFC. Knowing therefore the 
timing of when a period of general constraint and volatility will occur is therefore 
considered by the authors to be a largely unpredictable part of the business cycle for the 
purposes of this study. With this assumption standing the ability to obtain financing for 
projects without difficulty becomes highly pertinent. The discussion of cash holdings and 
its value creating or destroying potential creates an intriguing and interesting study with 
many avenues of assessment. 
The majority of papers delve into the pros and cons of cash holdings looking at a plethora 
of topics and niche discussion areas, however, stop short of discussing whether their 
results translate into positive or negative stock returns for investors. It is therefore the 
intention of this paper to fill this gap in the research by assessing cash holdings through a 
shareholder lens, ascertaining if cash holdings share a linear relationship with stock 
returns. Are corporate excess cash holdings a source of value creation for shareholders? 
This paper is the result of thorough research into the topic of cash, utilising an extensive 
amount of studies. These studies are of both core theoretical ideas and frameworks and 
the empirical assessment of these frameworks. Furthermore, studies researched cover 
over 74 years of research and samples that cover 60 years of analysis. 
The shareholder perspective leads us to also delve into the motives behind why 
companies seek to create excess stores of cash. By having a greater understanding of 
these motives the investor is better equipped to assess the nature of the cash holdings and 
therefore construct a pertinent investment portfolio. For example, are the cash holdings of 
a firm idle (the company is lacking positive investment opportunities) or are they held for 
a particular value creating purpose? Perhaps the firm perceives opportunity cost in the 
present to be less than gains from investment in the future. 
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Motives of firms to hold cash were first documented by Keynes (1936). His initial studies 
into this subject matter presented the transaction, precautionary and speculative motives. 
Further studies by Jensen & Meckling (1976) postulated the agency motive and finally 
Foley, Hartzell, Titman, and Twite (2007) added the tax motive. This paper discusses 
these motives and provides a comprehensive list of articles analysing them in section 2.0. 
These motives help to explain why companies hold cash. 
Further research has been conducted as to if holding cash adds value to the firm and 
indeed what scenarios cash has the greatest advantage. These scenarios are primarily 
those that look into the impact of cash against different levels of constraint placed on a 
firm (from both internal and external factors). The papers on cash holdings delve into a 
range of different aspects. These studies largely present evidence on specific scenarios 
distant from peer’s parallel research. Taking into account those studies that we have 
researched, there is no conclusive evidence that cash is either absolutely value creating or 
absolutely value destroying. Its benefits and drawbacks are rather situation and policy 
dependant and its use is hence subject to the diligence of those that employ it as part of 
firm strategy. Thus understanding the value of cash through the assessment of its 
relationship to stock price across periods of constraint and non-constraint will further the 
research into its value potential to the firm and shareholder. 
Our study primarily aims to investigate the relationship of excess cash on firm stock 
returns. To assess this we conduct a thorough empirical investigation first running a 
multivariate regression to isolate excess cash from regular cash holdings. These excess 
cash results are the residual of the regression and is performed on a sample of 2278 
companies. Based on the resultant excess cash level findings we construct a multitude of 
portfolios (1800) to assess the impact of excess cash reserves on stock price. Therefore 
we endeavour to shed some light on the topic from a shareholder perspective.  
The bulk of previous studies do not analyse the topic of cash holdings utilising a 
timeframe focused on the immediate years surrounding a crisis. Many of the studies 
either focus entirely on the boom times, entirely on the bust times or over an extended 
long-term period. We aim to delve into the immediate years pre point of crisis and the 
immediate years post point of crisis. The empirical study will concentrate on specific 
yearly time periods as well as the whole period. By analysing this time frame the study 
therefore assesses periods of financial constraint and financial freedom. 
The study is therefore multidimensional in that it explores excess cash holdings and their 
impact on stock returns, whilst also measuring these returns across unique but connected 
periods of differing economic environments. 
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1.3 Purpose 
This study will focus on what cash holdings mean to the firm and if cash holdings create 
direct tangible value for the investor. Through the empirical study, it will investigate to 
what extent firms being cash rich impacts upon stock returns and hence if a linear 
relationship exists that can be referenced when creating a portfolio. 
After extensive review of literature and papers relevant to the concept of cash holdings 
within firms it is apparent that there is a certain disconnect or independence at times 
between different studies and hence this study will also look to create a comprehensive 
overview of the cash implications on firms utilising the plethora of research that is 
currently published. A secondary aim of this study will be the mapping of key 
characteristics for investors and future researchers to be aware of when assessing the 
viability of a cash rich firm to be part of their investment portfolio, or in the latter 
conducting analysis. Furthermore on this stream of analysis, which very few studies have 
assessed, is how firms’ cash levels impact upon stock returns, that is, if there is a certain 
relationship between excess cash holdings and stock performance. Therefore the 
empirical analysis of this paper will be to examine a number of constructed portfolios to 
assess the value of cash within a company from the investor perspective. Analysis will be 
conducted in boom times as well as bust times and will therefore provide evidence as to 
its value to stockholders across both peaks and troughs within the economy. 
The key purpose of this paper is: 
1) Identify and map those characteristics, based on previous studies, that are 
pertinent for shareholders to be aware of when investing in cash rich firms. This 
will also provide a comprehensive base for our own empirical study and from 
which future researchers can draw from. 
2) Investigate whether there is a link between excess cash and stock returns analysed 
during a period of boom, crisis and across the whole period. This will allow a 
determination of implications of holding excess cash in different market states. 
3) Provide shareholders with the knowledge and means to decipher the meaning of 
cash holdings within companies and enable shareholders to increase their ability 
to select sound investment portfolios. 
1.4 Delimitations 
Information for the empirical analysis was obtained from DataStream. The reliance on 
DataStream to construct our sample puts a limit on the size of the sample, as we are 
limited to the selection of companies that have information for all data items across all 
analysis time points within the defined reference period. 
9 
 
One of the problems with DataStream was the inability to identify if a company had 
ceased operations or if their information simply didn’t exist on DataStream. We 
considered individual firm assessment to establish if firms were alive or ceased (an 
arduous task considering this would be performed on a company by company basis). 
However, through research within our studies we found that Harford, Mikkelson and 
Partch (2003) established that higher levels of cash to assets do not seem to lead to higher 
rates of survival during industry downturns. As default probability is independent to cash 
levels our findings won’t be biased through the exclusion of these particular firms. 
Furthermore, Simutin (2010) found that whether his entire sample or survivor only firms 
were used to evaluate the topic, his findings and conclusion were of a similar nature. 
Therefore we conclude that the exclusion of these observations will not negatively impact 
upon the accuracy of our results. 
1.5 Thesis Outline 
Chapter two presents the literature review, discussing the theoretical and empirical 
frameworks that this thesis draws from. The motives behind cash holdings are discussed, 
empirical studies analysed, a literature map provided and finally commentary on previous 
studies provided. Chapter three looks into the methodological framework and delves into 
the research approach, data collection, regression and portfolio formation. Finally assess 
the validity of the methods ensuring the quality of the study. Chapter four presents the 
findings of the study through descriptive statistics, the regression results and the portfolio 
results. Chapter five provides an analysis across the pertinent time frames conducting an 
in depth look into the empirical results to ascertain sound inferences and analysis. 
Chapter 6 summarises the findings and presents the conclusions of the study. 
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2.0 Literature Review 
________________________________________________________________________ 
The literature review chapter first provides an overview of the major motives behind 
holding cash delving into each motive in detail. Secondly a review of empirical studies 
shows the major findings regarding determinants and implications of cash holdings. A 
small section on corporate governance and cash holdings is included purely for its 
contribution to the shareholder perspective. A literature map is provided showing the 
extensive research that has been conducted within the research area and for the 
development of this paper and finally commentary on previous studies provided. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
2.1 Motives for Holding Cash 
Five key motives have been identified as to why firms hold cash reserves. This section 
will explain these motives in detail first providing an overview through the following 
summary chart. 
 
 
 
2.1.1 Transaction Motive 
The Modigliani-Miller theorem on capital structure assumes no transaction costs, 
therefore in a frictionless environment there is no distinction between utilising internal or 
external capital markets. Firms will have no motivation to hold cash, as access to external 
financing is unrestricted and does not incur any costs. In the presence of transaction costs 
Precautionary	  
Speculative	  
Tax	  
Agency	  
Transaction	  
(1) Transaction: stockpiling cash to create internal financing 
capacity to minimise the cost of raising capital for 
investments. Including both direct and indirect costs,  
this cost minimisation is due to the excess costs 
involved in raising capital externally, 
whether through debt or equity. 
 
(2) Precautionary: defensive strategy where firms hold cash 
reserves as a call option against volatility in the marketplace  
to create a cushion against threats to liquidity. 
(3) Speculative: An offensive strategy 
where firms build cash stores to take 
advantage of unforeseen or unexpected 
opportunities in a timely manner. 
(4) Tax: ‘Firms have a disincentive to repatriate foreign earnings if 
the level of taxation in their home country is substantially higher 
than that of the other countries within which they operate. This can 
result in multinational firms accumulating foreign stores of cash.’ 
(Foley, Hartzell, Titman, and Twite 2007). 
 
(5) Agency: Managers hoard cash or 
utilise large cash reserves to serve 
their own interests. This can lead to 
the acceptance of negative value 
projects, empire building and 
general mismatch between 
managers and other stakeholders. 
 
NOTE: (1) to (4) can be considered as 
positive cash holding scenarios, 
positive dependant on the situation. (5) 
can be considered as a negative 
outcome of large cash holdings. 
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however, a value-maximizing firm will determine its optimum level of cash by evaluating 
its marginal costs against its marginal benefits (Keynes, 1936). The assessment of the 
optimum level takes into consideration factors such as the cost disparity between external 
and internal financing.  
Transaction costs can be direct: underwriting costs, legal fees, borrowing fees, third party 
fees, consulting fees, cash required to meet routine expenses or requirements; and indirect: 
for example stakeholder conflicts identified by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers 
(1984) and information asymmetries with outside investors (Myers & Majluf, 1984). As 
capital market frictions increase the cost of outside capital relative to internally generated 
funds increases. These transaction costs can be avoided to some extent by utilising 
internal financing, that is, using cash reserves to fund value-increasing investments and 
therefore serve stockholders´ interests.  
On the downside, holding cash and other liquid assets does not deliver pure benefits. The 
opportunity cost associated with liquid assets is usually referred to as a liquidity premium, 
as cash and liquid assets that are easily turned into cash will normally generate lower 
pecuniary returns. 
Evidence presented by studies on transaction costs points towards the idea that firms 
engaging in external fundraising experience higher costs, both direct and indirect, than 
firms that rely on internally generated funds (Smith, 1977; Mikkelson & Partch, 1986). 
Further evidence reveals economies of scale under the transaction motive allowing for 
cost effective raising of external funds. Therefore large firms tend to hold less cash 
whereas smaller firms hold more cash to avoid the premium of attaining the funds 
externally (Lee, Lochhead, Ritter, & Zhao, 1996; Mulligan, 1997; Kim, Mauer, & 
Sherman, 1998) also find that firms are becoming more and more R&D intensive and 
thus hold higher levels of intangible assets making external financing more costly. 
2.1.2 Precautionary Motive 
Firms hold cash reserves as a call option against volatility in the marketplace to create a 
cushion against threats to liquidity and access to external capital markets. Han & Qui 
(2007, p. 44) define the precautionary motive as when ‘a firm reserves cash to hedge for 
the risk of future cash shortfalls.’ Bates Kahle & Stulz (2009, p. 2) define the 
precautionary motive as firms holding ‘cash as a buffer to protect against adverse cash 
flow shocks. This insinuates that firms with poor access to external capital markets and 
riskier cash flows will hold more cash to ensure the ability (availability of funds) to 
execute value enhancing investment opportunities as they become available. This was 
investigated by and is consistent with the findings of Opler et al. (1999). Furthermore, 
this type of company has per se higher costs of financial distress and therefore 
management act in a way that is reflective of a firm with high levels of debt. 
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As identified by Han & Qui (2007), financially constrained firms suffer higher sensitivity 
to cash flow volatility. A trade-off presents itself between current and future investments. 
‘When future cash flow risk cannot be fully diversifiable, the trade-off gives constrained 
firms the incentives of precautionary savings: they increase their cash holdings in 
response to increases in cash flow volatility,’ (Han & Qui, 2007, p. 1). Conceivably a 
cash build up will also occur if the company perceives future investments to hold greater 
value than current investment, or investments in downturns will give greater returns than 
investments in boom times. It is also plausible that an unconstrained firm that perceives a 
forward position of constraint and volatility may follow a similar precautionary strategy 
of cash stockpiling (Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, & Williamson, 1999; Keynes, 1936). 
2.1.3 Speculative Motive 
Building cash stores to take advantage of unexpected opportunities. For example, taking 
advantage of favourable price fluctuations, interest rate fluctuations, and raw material 
fluctuations. The ability to make timely (snap on-time) acquisitions (Keynes, 1936). 
The speculative motive differs from the precautionary motive in that it is an offensive 
rather than defensive. 
2.1.4 Tax Motive 
Firms have a disincentive to repatriate foreign earnings if the level of taxation in their 
home country is substantially higher than that of the other countries within which they 
operate. This can result in multinational firms accumulating foreign stores of cash (Foley, 
Hartzell, Titman, & Twite, 2007). 
2.1.5 Agency Motive 
When facing abundant cash and the decision on what to do with it, managers will have 
four options. They can disperse the cash back to the firm’s shareholders, spend it on 
internal or external investments, or simply continue to hold on to it. The interest and 
incentives of managers on what to do with the firm’s cash is not however always aligned 
with those of the stockholders. Jensen (1986) finds that by financing projects internally 
managers can avoid monitoring by the capital markets otherwise incurred when raising 
funds externally. Paying the cash out to stockholders, or pledging it to the repayment of 
debt, the resources under the control of managers will be reduced. This reduces the 
managers’ power to exploit the firms’ cash for their own benefits (Jensen, 1986; 
Easterbrook, 1984; Rozeff, 1982).  
There are numerous ways and reasons for managers to exploit the firm’s resources. With 
compensation being one of them it has been shown that managers tend to make the firm 
grow beyond its optimal size to increase the resources under their control. Compensation 
is often related to the growth in sales (Murphy, 1985) and growth also increases the 
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supply of new positions that allow for the promotion of middle managers through 
promotion-based compensation schemes (Baker, 1986). The conflicts between managers 
and stockholders are further enhanced, as managers of cash rich firms tend to drive 
growth through value decreasing investments (Harford, 1999).  
As competition increases within an industry prices tend to slope downwards, forcing 
managers to increase efficiency. Another problem identified with investments where 
abundant cash is at hand is that managers tend to show weaker disciplinary actions and 
thus waste stockholders money on inefficiencies(Jensen, 1986). 
The agency theory relation to cash is therefore how to align managers and stockholders 
interest by motivating managers not to spend the firm’s cash on value-decreasing 
investments and operating inefficiencies. 
 
2.2 Empirical Evidence on Cash Holdings 
2.2.1 Determinants and Implications of Cash Holdings 
Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999) explored the determinants and 
implications of corporate cash holdings. By looking at 530 publicly traded U.S firms 
across the years 1971-1994 they performed tests to see whether firms act as if they have a 
target level of cash holdings. By using an autoregressive model they established that there 
are systematic factors that causes firms not to let cash balances fall too low or rise too 
high. Their results were therefore positive to their hypothesis and that raised the question 
of how these target levels are set. By utilising a cross-sectional regression they 
determined several influencing factors relating to the determinants of cash balances 
including corporate growth prospects, short-term working capital imbalances, leverage, 
industry volatility, and firm size. From these regressions they found that many firms held 
excess liquid asset positions.  They defined excess cash as the amount of cash held in 
excess of that predicted by their model. Further questions emerged; why do firms hold 
excess cash, does it allow them to make expenditure decisions that they would not 
otherwise make and what is the main reason that firms experience large changes in excess 
cash. Their results indicate that firms with higher growth opportunities tend to hold more 
cash. They also find evidence that firms with greater access to capital markets, that is 
large firms and those with credit ratings, hold less cash than smaller firms that have both 
higher costs and more limited access to external financing. These results are both 
consistent with precautionary as well as transactional motives for holding cash. 
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In his paper on corporate cash reserves and acquisitions, Harford (1999) aimed towards 
providing an answer to Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow theory, that firms with high cash 
flows and cash balances would be more prone to spend the cash on value decreasing 
investments. The research period of his study was 1972-1994. By utilising a similar 
regression model introduced by Opler et al. (1997) he estimates the levels of cash and 
determines that cash rich firms are those with cash holdings of one standard deviation 
above the one predicted by the model. He detects the same correlation between cash 
balances and future growth options as Opler et al. (1999) found in their studies. To 
determine whether cash rich firms tend to make bad investment decisions he focuses on 
announcement effects of acquisitions as well as operating performance prior to and after 
the acquisition. His results show a negative relationship between acquisitions made by 
cash rich bidders and the subsequent market reactions. This is supported by the idea that 
cash rich acquirers bid for firms that are unattractive and/or diversifying. Unattractive 
acquisitions are logically value destroying, and as reported by Morck, Schleifer and 
Vishny (1990), acquisitions of a diversifying nature have a lower likelihood to create 
value for the bidder. When looking at the operating performance of those firms that 
completed the announced acquisitions his results were firmly confirmed and firms 
realised the expected negative performance proposed by the announcement effect in the 
post acquisition period. In addition to these two main questions he looks into whether 
firms experience any movements in stock prices when building up the cash reserves. He 
finds his results support the free cash flow hypothesis and the markets react negatively to 
firms that stockpile cash and positively to firms that maintain their cash payout ratio. 
Mikkelson and Partch (2003) believed that it was essential to the discussion of cash 
holdings to consider whether high levels of cash where persistent and part of firms policy. 
They considered a sample of 89 U.S. publicly traded firms that held consistently high 
levels of cash, 25% or more of the total book value of assets, over the period 1986-1991 
and compared their performance to firms matched by size and industry for the subsequent 
five years, 1992-1996. Their research revealed that cash rich firms experienced greater 
operating performance than firms matched by size, industry and propensity to hoard cash. 
They took this analysis further, utilising a multivariate regression to assess if this 
relationship was also apparent when looking at excess cash. Interestingly excess cash did 
not share this relationship and was not related to operating performance. Consistent with 
Opler et al. (1997) and Harford (1999) they also found that cash rich firms grew faster, 
invested more and had higher market-to-book ratios. They found that ‘high cash firms do 
not have characteristics consistent with weak incentives or oversight of managers, in 
addition there is no unusual performance with firms with lower insider stock ownership, 
higher inside board composition or control by a founder.’ Hence they surmise that 
governance cannot act as a proxy to explain variation in performance among firms with 
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large cash holdings. Their findings are supportive of precautionary and speculative 
motives for holding cash. 
Harford, Mikkelson and Partch (2003) studied the effects of cash reserves on corporate 
investment and performance during and after industry downturns and how cash reserves 
affect operating performance through their effect on spending following the downturn. 
They define downturn as when the substantial majority of firms within an industry 
experience large decline in sales following a period of growth in sales.  To be more 
precise two conditions had to be met. Firstly, 75% of all the firms within an industry had 
to experience decline in sales and secondly the median of the sales decline for the firms 
had to be at least one standard deviation of median annual change in sales growth for the 
industry during the period 1980-1998. Their final sample consisted of 642 firms 
throughout eight industries. Their findings conclude that firms with higher cash levels are 
able to invest more during downturns compared to their peers and that those investments 
improve operating performance. Furthermore these effects are weaker and even absent 
outside of downturns. These findings are consistent both with precautionary and 
transactional motives for holding cash. 
The relationship between excess cash and stock returns was the focus of Simutin (2010). 
To get a measure of excess cash he utilises the findings of Opler et al. (1999) as a base 
for his regression model. The research period of his study covered a much longer period 
than previous studies had used before, 1960-2006. Simutin’s results show a strong 
relationship between future stock returns and excess cash holdings. Contrary to the 
intuition that cash would be more valuable during downturns he finds the opposite to be 
true. Firms with higher excess cash levels perform worse than their low excess cash peers. 
Furthermore he finds that future investments are strongly and positively correlated to 
excess cash. He finds a relationship between market beta and cash levels, market to book 
ratio and cash levels, and size and cash levels. By controlling for each of these variables 
his results are not affected and excess cash is still a good predictor of future stock returns. 
To further prove the robustness of his findings he utilises a Fama-McBeth regression 
controlling for a number of variables that are known to explain stock returns. The results 
from those regressions did not eliminate the explanatory power of excess cash as a 
predictor of future stock returns. 
2.2.2 Corporate Governance and Cash Holdings 
One of the central analysis in papers surrounding corporate governance and cash holdings 
is the sufficient provision of internal capital for managers to efficiently fund all good 
projects, while not providing excess internal capital as to allow managers to fund projects 
and acquisitions that are value destroying and at the expense of shareholders (avoiding 
agency costs) (Harford, Mansi, & Maxwell, 2008). 
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The difference between a poorly governed firm compared to a well governed firm is quite 
compelling. Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith (2007) test corporate governance quality on US 
firms through two fundamental variables, that of the degree of managerial entrenchment 
and secondly shareholder monitoring. These variables are analysed using four proxies: 
(1) Gompers et al. (2003) corporate governance index; (2) Bebchuck et al. (2005) index; 
(3) an institutional block ownership measure; and (4) a pension fund ownership measure. 
 
Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith (2007) show through regressions performed on all four measures 
that the value of a dollar of cash is less than a dollar in poorly governed firms and greater 
than a dollar in well governed firms. 
 
‘Using block ownership to measure governance, the value of a dollar of cash is $0.87 in a 
poorly governed firm but $1.23 in a well governed firm. Using management entrenchment 
due to anti-takeover provisions as a governance proxy, the value of a dollar is only $0.38 in a 
poorly governed firm but $1.54 in a well governed firm.’ 
 
These results show the importance for investors to be mindful of the state of corporate 
governance within firms they are considering an investment within. Due to potential 
agency problems and empire-building this is especially important so as not to destroy the 
value that holding cash can provide. Dijk, Schauten & Waal (2008) run an analysis on 
European firms and produce similar results showing that €1 invested by a poorly 
governed firm is worth €0.89 and €1.45 for a well-governed firm. They utilise Deminor 
ratings for their analysis which include: (1) rights and duties of shareholders; (2) range of 
takeover defences; (3) disclosure on financial matters and corporate governance; and (4) 
Board structure and functioning. 
 
The bulk of studies conclude that poorly governed firms leave management with the 
propensity to spend cash reserves quickly and in value decreasing external projects 
Harford (1999) & Harford, Mansi and Maxwell (2008). 
 
2.3 Literature Mapping 
This section provides a comprehensive literature map of empirical studies detailing their 
relationship to the key motives behind cash holdings. The information is presented in the 
following table entitled Summary of Previous Findings. 
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2.3.1 Summary of Previous Findings 
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2.4 Comments on Previous Studies 
Studies are largely focused on specific aspects of the firm and how that relates back to 
one or many of the motives of holding and utilising cash above other methods of 
financing the day-to-day firm expenses and investment in large projects and investment 
opportunities. The findings are often of a high calibre in their own right and help to add 
and complete the picture of a certain motive or core theorem however can fall short of 
putting their study in the context of the studies completed by their peers. Furthermore, the 
majority of studies don’t take their findings a step further to address impact (be it 
negative or positive) on the listed equity holdings of the firm. 
In terms of comparability, different studies utilise different time periods when examining 
the topic of cash holdings. Simutin (2010) explores a time period of 46 years and Harford 
(1999) 44 years while Denis and Sibilikov (2007) only use 5 years of observations. When 
looking at a long period such as Harford and Simutin do we need to acknowledge the fact 
that the economy and its characteristics change over time. Longer periods will also cover 
multiple business cycles while the studies with shorter time frame could only delve into a 
part of a single business cycle. 
Also of importance when comparing results of previous studies is the sample size. 
Smaller samples such as the 89 companies Mikkelson and Partch (2003) use for their 
study might not be a good representative of the population. The 2735 companies Bates, 
Kahle and Stulz (2009) look at would presumably be much more reflective of the 
population and hence give more reliable results. 
Studies on cash richness prior to Opler et al. (1999) do not adequately take into 
consideration the varying levels of base cash amounts that different companies use 
dependant on their individual and unique operating characteristics and circumstances. For 
example, Lang, Stulz & Walkling (1991) utilise a basic cash to asset ratio to identify cash 
richness. 
Further studies still subscribe to cash rich measures based on a percentage value of total 
cash to total book value of assets which is a questionable measure based again upon 
variances in firm individual characteristics and circumstances. They manually try to 
control for firm size and industry specifics however many parameters are still not 
incorporated. An example is Mikkelson and Partch (2003) where their main analysis on 
cash holdings effecting performance is measured in this questionable method. 
Opler et al. (1999) made an important contribution that allowed for a measure of cash 
richness that can be applied across industries and scenarios with reduction in the use of 
manual controls thereby facilitating a more efficient analysis. Their regression method 
establishes an excess cash level beyond those cash holdings utilised for day-to-day 
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activities thus a true measure of cash richness is identified. It is often the amount of cash 
in excess of base operations which is the important variable to analyse. 
The majority of modern studies draw from Opler et al. (1999). It can be witnessed that 
the analysis’ vary slightly on the definition of different input variables. This causes 
potential issues for the comparison of different studies.  For example, Harford (1999) 
Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith (2007), and Simutin (2010) all use slightly differing input 
definitions. 
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3.0 Method 
________________________________________________________________________ 
This chapter provides a thorough explanation of the methodology used to assess the 
research questions of this paper and delves into the research approach, data collection, 
regression and portfolio formation. Finally this section will also assess the validity of the 
methods ensuring the quality of the study. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
3.1 Research Approach 
Cash holdings as a research topic delves into a multitude of various elements as to why 
firms hold certain levels of cash and what cash holdings mean to the firm. Harford, 
Mikkelson and Partch (2003) document a positive relationship between cash reserves and 
investments during downturns and that these investments are beneficial and result in 
higher operating performance and sales growth. They document that operating 
performance increases the more that a company spends. Outside of downturns this 
relationship is does not hold as strongly. Simutin (2010) however finds the opposite to be 
true. Firms with high excess cash levels perform worse during downturns compared to 
their peers but outperform their low cash peers during periods of growth. Further research, 
due to inconsistent findings in previous papers, is therefore needed to establish more 
reliable results that will give better understanding as to whether excess cash translates 
into positive returns for the firms’ stockholders. 
The process of this study is based on a broad and thorough literature review, taking into 
consideration both theoretical as well as empirical works. Based on the theoretical 
framework a logical hypothesis is constructed. Relevant observations are then collected 
and the hypothesis is tested based on those observations. This research approach is 
described as a deductive research approach. 
The study aims to conclusively answer if excess cash has a direct impact on stock price in 
pre crisis boom years and the post crisis trough and recovery period. These questions are 
in line with previous research on the topic area and will be pitted against previous studies. 
We hypothesis that during the boom years excess cash will have a negative relationship 
to cash holdings or no relationship. Within the downturn and recovery period we 
hypothesis cash to hold a positive and strong relationship to stock price.  Finally we 
assess the period as a whole to ascertain the value of cash across the entire period to 
determine whether holding a cash rich portfolio is ultimately value destroying or 
increasing. 
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3.2 Data 
The data required to examine the relationship between cash holdings of firms and their 
stock returns is based on secondary sources, such as databases (e.g. COMPUSTAT and 
DataStream) and annual reports. For this study DataStream1 is used as the provider of all 
relevant observations needed to attain the results in order to answer the research 
questions. This method of obtaining data is consistent with methods used in previous 
studies.2 Using an immense database such as DataStream facilitates the construction of a 
large sample of firms allowing the reduction of systematic errors and skewness in the 
sample. All of the variables used in this study follow the definition provided by 
DataStream unless specified otherwise. 
3.2.1 Sample 
We construct a sample of U.S. based firms for our empirical tests using annual data for 
the 2005-2010 period. The sample data pertains to actively traded stocks on U.S. based 
stock exchanges (Nasdaq, NYSE, NYSE Amex and NYSE ARCA) of which DataStream 
has information on within the defined time period. Firms in the sample range from small 
cap to large cap and across all industries. Our original sample was subject to exclusions 
of observations due to reasons discussed within the exclusions section. We are not aware 
of any changes in accounting regulations within the study period that would impact our 
results. The final sample consists of 2278 listed and actively traded U.S. firms. 
The timeframe for our analysis is based on the global financial crisis. We perceive this 
timeframe to be a fairly pure period of boom and bust across all industries due to the 
nature of the failure of the financial sector triggering common high volatility and 
constraint across the economy. To this end we utilise the determinations of the National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). 
‘The National Bureau of Economic Research is a private, non-profit, nonpartisan research 
organization dedicated to promoting a greater understanding of how the economy works. The 
NBER is committed to undertaking and disseminating unbiased economic research among 
public policymakers, business professionals, and the academic community... they are the 
leading non-profit economic research organisation in the U.S... Eighteen of the 33 American 
Nobel Prize winners in Economics and six of the past Chairmen of the President's Council of 
Economic Advisers have been researchers at the NBER. The more than 1,000 professors of 
economics and business now teaching at colleges and universities in North America who are 
NBER researchers are the leading scholars in their fields. These Bureau associates 
concentrate on four types of empirical research: developing new statistical measurements, 
                                                
1 DataStream is a database by Thomson Reuters and provids, amongst others, company specific data. 
2 See for example Harford, Mikkelson and Partch (2003) and Simutin (2010) 
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estimating quantitative models of economic behaviour, assessing the economic effects of 
public policies, and projecting the effects of alternative policy proposals’ 
Their determination is that the crisis began in December 2007 and lasted until June 2009. 
A period of 18 months (the longest of any recession since WW2).  They base their 
determination on the behaviour of various indicators of the economy. These indicators 
include: 
- Macroeconomic Advisers’ monthly GDP 
- The Stock-Watson index of monthly GDP 
- Their index of monthly GDI 
- An average of their two indexes of monthly GDP and GDI 
- Real manufacturing and trade sales 
- Index of Industrial Production 
- Real personal income less transfers 
- Aggregate hours of work in the total economy 
- Payroll survey employment 
- Household survey employment 
NBER (2010) 
Our timeframe therefore begins two years prior (data is from three years prior to account 
for lag) to the beginning of the crisis and ends three years post the beginning of the crisis. 
This enables a focused analysis of boom and bust years surrounding a period of crisis. 
The following graph depicts the shape of the period in question with markers showing the 
start and close of the GFC. 
 
NBER (2010) 
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3.2.2 Exclusions 
A number of observations had to be excluded from the original sample in order to 
minimise statistical errors caused by missing data items or further reasons discussed 
within this section. First we have excluded all financial and utilities firms as these firms 
may be subject to regulatory supervision and may carry cash to meet capital requirements. 
The reasons for cash holdings of these firms are therefore not in line with the economic 
reasons discussed and studied in this paper. Second, all firms traded on OTC markets and 
so called Pink Sheet firms are also excluded as they are not required to disclose any data 
by regulatory agencies such as the SEC. Furthermore price fluctuations can be very 
severe or none at all over an extended period of time as the stocks for these firms are not 
frequently traded. Data obtained for OTC traded and Pink Sheet firms are therefore not 
fully reliable and are excluded as mentioned before. Third, all firms with missing data 
items for any of the given years were excluded as the reasons for the missing data is not 
known. After investigation on randomly selected firms with missing data we concluded 
that there was no systematic reason for why the data was missing. Including these firms 
could therefore give rise to misleading results. Furthermore, according to the studies of 
Harford, Mikkelson and Partch (2003) and Simutin (2010) findings will not be impacted 
upon by the exclusion of non-survivors.  
3.3 Regression 
This section provides an overview of the regression that has been conducted within this 
research paper. The regression model is utilised to establish the excess levels of cash that 
firms carry and is based upon the research of Opler et al. (1999) and Simutin (2010). 
Cash holdings can vary substantially amongst firms based on numerous factors such as 
industry, recent activities and nature of the firms business3. In order to appropriately 
establish the cash richness of a firm it is important to account for firm specific differences. 
We begin by focusing on the measure of excess cash; that is, cash that is in surplus of 
cash required for fixed non-flexible predetermined use in the firm’s operations. Opler et 
al. (1999) explored the determinants of corporate cash holdings and their model for 
determining firms’ liquid assets has been widely used and recognised in subsequent and 
present studies. This model provides the base for the excess cash measure used in this 
study.  
3.3.1 The Regression Model 
The following is the regression model used to assess the excess cash measure: 
Ci! = " 0t + #1 tMBi! + # 2 tSizei! +# 3 tCPXi! + # 4 tWCi! + # 5t Li! + # 6t RDi! + # 7 tCFi! + #8 t$ i!IN D + # 9 tDivi! + % it  
                                                
3 See for example Opler et al. (1999), Drobetz and Gruninger (2007) and Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009) 
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Since liquidity can’t be negative the dependent variable in the regression model is the 
natural logarithm of liquid asset holdings. Alfa represents the intercept; beta the 
coefficients and the variable names represent different input variables. The excess cash 
measure is characterized by the equations residual, ! . 
3.3.2 Variables4 
3.3.2.1 Dependant variable 
Liquid asset holdings (C). The dependent variable in the regression model is the natural 
logarithm of liquid asset holdings. Liquid asset holdings are measured as the ratio of cash 
and short-term investments divided by total assets less cash and short-term investments.  
! = !" !"#ℎ  !"#  !"#ℎ  !"#$%&'()*+  !"#$%  !""#  !"#$%  !"  !""#$" −   !"#ℎ  !"#  !"#ℎ  !"#$%&'()*+  
3.3.2.2 Independent variables5 
Market-to-book (MB). The book value of assets does not include future growth 
opportunities. Market value of assets on the other hand should reflect the value of all 
future growth options. Firms with higher market value compared to the book value 
should therefore reflect firms’ with greater future growth opportunities. To measure 
whether a firm will have positive NPV investment opportunities in the future we use the 
market-to-book ratio as defined in Opler et al (1999). The market-to-book ratio is defined 
as the book value of assets, less the book value of equity, plus market value of equity, 
divided by assets. 
!" =   !""#  !"#$%  !"  !""#$" − !""#  !"#$%  !"  !"#$%& +!"#$%&  !"#$%  !"  !"#$%&!""#$"  
 
Firm size (Size). To measure firm size we use the natural logarithm of the book value of 
real assets. Real assets are total assets at the end of the year measured in 2010 dollars. !"#$ = !"(!"#$%  !""#  !"#$%  !"  !""#$") 
 
                                                
4 Definitions of all variables are based on the research of Opler et al. (1999) 
5 For all independent variables that are deflated by assets, assets are defined as total assets less cash and 
short-term investments.  !""#$" = !"#$%  !""#  !"#$%  !"  !""#$" − !"#ℎ  !"#  !"#ℎ  !"#$%&'()*+ 
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Capital expenditures (CPX). CPX is measured as the ratio of capital expenditures to 
assets. 
!"# = !"#$%"&  !"#$%&'()*$+!""#$"  
 
Working Capital (WC). WC is measured as the ratio of working capital, less cash and 
short-term investments, divided by assets to account for liquid asset substitutes. 
!" =!"#$%&'  !"#!"#$ − !"#ℎ  !"#  !"#ℎ  !"#$%&'()*+!""#$"  
 
Financial Leverage (L). Leverage is measured as total debt (STD+LTD) divided the book 
value of assets. 
! = !ℎ!"#  !"#$  !"#$ + !"#$  !"#$  !"#$!"#$%  !""#  !"!"#  !"  !""#$"  
 
Financial distress cost (RD). To proxy for the potential of financial distress costs we use 
the ratio of R&D expenses divided by sales. 
!" = !"#"$%&ℎ  !"#  !"#"$%&'"()  !"#$%&$&!"#"$%"&  
 
Cash flow (CF). Cash flow is measured as EBIT less interest, taxes and dividends paid 
but before depreciation divided by assets. 
!" = !"#$ + !"#$"%&'(&)* − !"#$%$&# − !"#$% − !"##"$  !"#"$%&$'!"#$%  !""#  !"#$%  !"  !""#$"  
 
Cash flow riskiness (!!"#). To measure cash flow riskiness we use the standard deviation 
of industry cash flow divided by assets for the previous 10 years. Industry cash flow is 
computed as follows. For each firm the standard deviation of cash flow is computed and 
then the average of these standard deviations is taken across the firms industry. !!"# = !"#$%&#(!!"#$%  !"#!!"  !"#$%&'() 
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Dividend payment dummy (Div.). A dummy is defined and set equal to one in the years 
the firm paid dividend, otherwise it is set to zero. 
3.3.3 Reliability of the Regression Model 
A number of key diagnostics were performed to ensure the quality of the findings. The 
following aspects were analysed: normality, error variance of continuity 
(heteroscedasticity), independence of error variables (autocorrelation) and 
multicollinearity. 
Normality – To test for normality we utilise a set of normality tests (see results in 
appendices 1). The residuals show evidence against normality. However this should not 
impose a problem due to the large sample size. ANOVA and t-tests should be fairly 
robust to violations of this standard. 
Error Variance of Continuity – we utilised the Breusch-Pagan test and found that the 
error of variance variable was constant and therefore did not suffer from 
heteroscedasticity. In other words the requirement was satisfied and of a homoscedastic 
nature. 
Independence of error variables – checking for the autocorrelation of the error variables 
we utilised the Durbin-Watson statistic and found no evidence of non-independence. 
Multicollinearity – there is no significant relationship between the independent variables 
hence there is no multicollinearity. This was tested through correlation matrix (see 
appendices 2). This indicates a viable regression model. 
In conclusion the regression meets the required conditions that: the mean of the error 
distribution is zero, the standard deviation of ! is !! (constant), the errors are independent 
and the errors are independent of the independent variables. ANOVA and t-tests should 
be robust to violations in normality due to the large sample size. 
3.4 Portfolio Construction 
The construction of the portfolios and their analysis is a complex process. The following 
steps explain the method in which the portfolio analysis was completed: 
1. Based on the findings of the regression, companies are sorted into 10 deciles 
utilising their level of excess cash. 
2. Portfolios are revolved on a yearly basis. This involves reassessing the excess 
cash levels of all firms and re-allocating firms to the appropriate portfolio for their 
level of excess cash. This use of a revolving system ensures that the yearly 
analysis of excess cash deciles to returns remains true and a proper relationship 
can be assessed. The number of portfolios over the reference period totals to 1800. 
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3. Total Shareholder Return (TSR) is calculated for each of the 2278 firms. To 
calculate the portfolios’ individual returns we utilise the value weighted average 
return of the firms within a particular portfolio. We acknowledge the assumption 
of this approach: that stock prices are efficient in their reflection of firm 
fundamentals and prospects, representing the fair equity value of the firm. 
4. We construct tables for each year consisting of the excess cash portfolios and 
their returns. We also include the average values of relevant variables that have 
been postulated in theory to explain stock returns. These variables are beta, 
market-book and size. 
5. Finally we analyse the results and test the strength of the relationship between 
excess cash and returns. We test for correlation and also run controlled portfolios 
on the afore mentioned variables and assess if the relationship still holds. In other 
words, we fix other potential influencing variables testing if excess cash maintains 
its relationship to stock returns. 
 
3.5 Validity and Reliability 
We base the methodological framework for our study on previous papers. The models 
used to determine measures of excess cash and the comparability of those measures to 
stock returns have all been recognised and used in previous studies. Previous studies have 
performed numerous robustness tests that have positively confirmed the method to be 
sound. The method chosen in our research is therefore considered to be valid and 
applicable. 
To ensure the reliability of the study we utilise known methods of attaining data through 
recognised and valid databases as well as applying known methods of analysis. All data 
used for this study is obtained through DataStream and therefore considered reliable. 
Exclusions of observations are solely based on theoretical foundation and missing data, 
consistent with methods used in previous studies. To ensure correct calculations all 
regressions where performed with Statplus®. 
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4.0 Empirical Findings 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Empirical findings provides descriptive statistics on the sample and detailed reviews of the 
regression and portfolio findings. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The total sample consists of 2278 unique firms and is observed across a period of six 
years with a one-year lag. Analysis is performed on the period 2005 - 2010. This amounts 
to 13668 firm year observations. The following summary table provides an overview of 
data items pertinent to the analysis. 
 
Important for the analysis is that there is no obtuse skewness within the dependant 
variable (cash ratio). The only concerns surrounding skewness are within MB and R&D. 
It should be noted that the size of the firm is CPI adjusted to 2010 outputs. The various 
range results (difference between maximum and minimum) indicates a good spread and 
therefore good firm representation. This, coupled with the quality of the spread across 
industries and the number of unique firms, results in a sound sample from which one can 
conduct analysis and draw informed conclusions. 
In terms of shifts across individual years (see appendices 3) the cash ratio becomes much 
lower during bust years and increases again at the latter stages of recovery. This indicates 
an increased usage of cash during times of constraint. Across the same period, as 
expected, market-book drops dramatically in the crisis years and improves into the 
recovery. 
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CAPEX and working capital fall in the crisis period and are yet to revert back to pre-
crisis levels at the close of the analysis. Cash flows fall negative for two consecutive 
years are become positive again at the close of 2009. 
These statistics present a clear picture of the period under analysis. Firms are moving 
from a period of boom (non constraint) to a period of bust (constraint) and finally we 
witness the early signs of recovery. 
The descriptive statistics present a story of a sound sample from which one can gain 
quality inferences and also an insight into the period of study, thus assuring that in this 
regard the requirements of the study have been met. 
4.2 Regression Results 
The results are largely consistent with previous studies, namely, Opler et al. (1999) and 
Simutin (2010). The following Linear Regression table reports the results of the cross 
sectional regressions used to estimate excess cash measures. Reported are average 
coefficients of year-end cross sectional regressions, corresponding t-statistics and p-
values and the average !!. Individual year regressions can be found in appendices 4.  
 
The following explanations discuss the meaning of the coefficient sign that each variable 
has received: 
Market-Book (+) – a positive sign for market-book is consistent with the notion that 
firms with higher growth opportunities hold higher levels of cash. 
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Size (-) – consistent with the notion that larger firms have lower cash ratios due to their 
ability to utilise economies of scale in attaining external financing. 
CAPEX (-) – firms with high CAPEX hold less cash. 
Working Capital (-) – this is consistent with the notion that working capital is a substitute 
for cash. 
Leverage (-) – firms with high Leverage hold less cash. 
R&D (+) – firms with higher R&D are more likely to face financing problems due to 
asymmetric information in times of economic distress and hence hold more cash (Opler 
et al., 1999). 
Cash Flows (-) – firms with high cash flows hold less cash. This is consistent with the 
notion that firms with stronger cash flows require less cash on hand and have better 
access to debt. 
Industry Sigma (+) – consistent with the notion that firms suffering higher volatility in 
cash flows hold cash as a buffer. 
Dividend Dummy (-) – firms that pay out more dividends retain less cash. 
The coefficients for CAPEX, R&D and industry sigma are not statistically significant at 
the 2% level. 
4.3 Portfolio Results 
The portfolio results are analysed across all years from 2006 – 2010. We also assess the 
inherent periods within the time frame looking at the boom years precluding the GFC 
(2006-2007), the crash and recovery period (2008-2010) and finally the period as a whole 
(2006-2010). See appendices 5 and 6 for an overview of results to be utilised in 
conjunction with the text of this section. 
On a whole throughout all tested time periods we report a positive relationship between 
excess cash levels and stock returns. This relationship is not monotonic. This relationship 
does experience differing explanatory power across the various periods. The !! values 
for the boom period, crash and recovery period and finally across the whole time frame 
are 1.7%, 11.6% and 6.5% respectively. 
We explore this relationship further by testing for correlation between excess cash and 
relevant variables (beta, market-book and size) and then test the impact of these variables 
on findings. We test them through controlling them (effectively holding the variable 
stationary) and applying the ten deciles of excess cash to ascertain if the relationship to 
stock returns still holds. 
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The findings of the controlled assessment give slightly different results. The slope is still 
positive when controlling for market-to-book for all time periods and the explanatory 
power stays relatively the same. When controlling for size, the correlation between 
excess cash and stock returns remains positive when assessing the whole period. 
However, we observe a negative slope when looking at the 2006-2007 period indicating 
that firms get punished for holding excess cash in times of low constraint. When looking 
at the time period 2008-2010 we see good positive relationship between excess cash and 
stock returns. This is consistent with the notion that cash becomes more valuable during 
times of financial constraint. In the third test where the excess cash portfolios are all 
exposed to the same risk (beta held constant) the explanatory power drops dramatically as 
does the effect excess cash has on stock returns. The relationship is however consistent 
when controlling for size; the coefficient is positive for the 2006-2010 period, negative 
for times of low constraints and positive during times of crisis.  The changes in the 
relationship of excess cash and stock returns when controlling for size and beta suggest 
that these two variables impact upon stock returns. 
In the times of constraint we consistently witness a dramatic increase in the explanatory 
power as well and the effect excess cash holdings have on stock returns. The relationship 
is however not as monotonic when looking at the boom times. 
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5.0 Analysis & Discussion 
________________________________________________________________________ 
This section discusses the findings of the portfolio results from chapter four. The findings 
are assessed per specific time periods of boom (non-constraint), downturn and recovery 
(constraint) and the periods combined as a whole. Each period will be defined by its 
market characteristics, how these relate to theory, a hypothesis formed based on this 
theory and the results of the study discussed forming context and pertinence for the 
analysis. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
5.1 Analysis of Time Periods 
5.1.1 [2006 – 2007] Boom Period 
This period is one marked by low constraint and general financial freedom. Companies in 
this financial setting, on a whole, should have an ease of access to lines of credit and 
hence the value of excess cash holdings is theoretically diminished across the broad 
spectrum of the market. Cash should therefore be less valuable in this time period. 
We hypothesis a negative relationship and/or minimal explanatory power of excess cash 
upon stock returns. This should reflect a perceived opportunity cost of holding cash. 
Our uncontrolled results suggest a slightly positive connection between excess cash and 
stock returns. However, as expected, the explanatory power of this observation is very 
low with a !! of only 1.7%. When controlling for different variables the most apparent 
finding is when controlling for size. Here we see quite a negative slope with an !! of 
52%. This result suggests that excess cash, as postulated and in-line with theory and past 
studies, is not beneficial in times of financial freedom. 
The consensus of our findings within this period is that holding excess cash is not 
perceived to be beneficial to the firm and generally does not explain the movements in 
stock price. A strategy of long high ECM portfolio and short low ECM would yield an 
average yearly return of -3.72% in the uncontrolled portfolios and -4.62% in the portfolio 
where firm size no longer has an impact. This would reflect previous findings such as by 
Harford (1999) where excess cash leads to poor investment choices.  
5.1.2 [2008 – 2010] Downturn & Recovery Period 
Following from the boom period we shift into a period of high constraint and high 
volatility. Within this period access to credit lines should be diminished across the broad 
spectrum of the market. The value of excess cash holding should therefore increase. As 
excess cash is now of a greater pertinence to a firm’s ability to enact investment 
opportunities, we hypothesis that excess cash should attain a positive slope to returns and 
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achieve higher explanatory power. This should reflect a perceived value enhancer 
through the retention of financial flexibility. This relates to the precautionary motive, that 
is, holding cash as a call option. 
Our uncontrolled results show a positive slope that increases in steepness compared with 
the boom period. We also witness a marked increase in !! to 11.6% which suggests that 
excess cash within a period of downturn accounts for a much greater element of the 
movements in the stock price. This is in-line with our hypothesis regarding the benefits of 
flexibility. In regards to the explanatory power, internal sources of financing have 
become more important to the financing of projects and hence this is reflected in greater 
explanatory of excess cash on stock returns. 
Our controlled analysis again supports the findings of the uncontrolled. Again we witness 
an interesting story coming out of the size variable. The positive slope is much steeper 
and has an !!  !"#$%  !"  68%. 
A further story of interest within this period is that during 2008, when the down swing of 
the market initially occurred, firms with higher levels of excess cash underperformed 
those companies with lower excess cash. Simutin (2010) came to the same conclusions 
that firms with higher levels of excess cash underperformed the firms with lower excess 
cash during periods of constraint. We would try to explain this relationship by the fact 
that smaller firms tend to hold more cash than larger firms. This observation is further 
strengthened when we look at the portfolios that have been controlled for size. In this 
circumstance excess cash has a positive relationship to stock returns giving proof to our 
explanation. 
As noted before, the level of cash firms hold drops substantially during the period of 
crisis. This would suggest that firms utilise their cash holding in market downturn and 
experience greater future stock returns. This is consistent with the findings of Harford, 
Mikkelson and Partch (2003) where the ability to continue investments during downturn 
resulted in improved post downturn operating performance. 
The consensus of our findings for this period is that holding excess cash is perceived to 
be beneficial to the firm in times of downturn and recovery. 
5.1.3 [2006 – 2010] Whole Period 
The whole period analysis allows for the story of if excess cash holdings give a positive 
or negative return across market peaks and troughs over an extended period of time.  
Uncontrolled findings give a slightly positive slope with an !! value of 6.5%. When 
controlling for market-book and size we also find a positive slope with !! values of 22% 
and 35% respectively. 
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The consensus of these results suggests a slightly positive relationship across the whole 
period. From the shareholder’s perspective the findings indicate that there is indeed value 
in a share portfolio that holds a high level of excess cash. 
 
5.2 Discussion of Results 
We document a link between excess cash and different market states. In times of boom 
we document a slightly positive relationship with a low explanatory value. The high 
minus low evaluation indicates that high excess cash firms generate less returns on their 
stocks that low excess cash firms. 
 
In times of constraint we document a positive relationship between high excess cash and 
returns. This relationship holds across all controlled tests showing that in times of 
constraint excess cash becomes a value enhancer for the investor. 
 
Overall we document a positive relationship between excess cash holdings and stock 
returns. To this end our findings also confirm the precautionary and speculative motives 
for holdings cash as a way of creating value for the company and investors. 
 
5.3 Further Discussion (!!) 
A further interesting relationship within the findings is a consistent shift in the !! values 
from low explanatory power within boom times and at times incredibly high explanatory 
power within the periods of bust and recovery on consistent positive slopes. This perhaps 
is explained or indeed helps to explain the differences that constraint places upon cash 
usage. 
 
Studies such as Harford, Mikkelson and Partch (2003) provide evidence that cash is most 
useful for firms suffering constraint where access to external money markets is restricted 
and hence that value of internal financing capacity much higher. 
 
The empirical study utilising the GFC gave the opportunity to analyse a large sample of 
companies that should be feeling fairly uniform non-constraint in the boom years and 
again fairly uniform constraint in the downturn. 
 
The increased explanatory power of excess cash in the downturn and recovery period 
suggests that in these periods cash did become a much more important element of 
enacting investment opportunities and thus supports the idea that excess cash is beneficial 
in negative financial climates. To this extent it’s not the absolute !!  value that is 
important but rather the positive shift in !! value showing the increased worth of cash in 
a downturn. 
 
In combining the absolute value of !! a further inference can be made. The generally low !! is perhaps indicative of the fact that by merely having excess cash it doesn’t mean that 
a firm has the investment opportunities to be enacted by that excess cash. A further 
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inference is perhaps that as the explanatory power grows the cash portion within general 
firm investments is increasing. Hence the value of excess cash is not as a producer of 
investment opportunity but an enabler of investment opportunity. As constraint rises and 
more cash is used to fuel investments we see the explanatory value rise. What does this 
mean to the investor? This confirms the past findings that the value of cash is situation 
and policy dependant. At the very least an investor knows that a firm with high excess 
cash is enabled to take advantage of an investment opportunity. As the findings show a 
positive slope it also means that if an investment opportunity should arise in times of 
constraint the company with higher excess cash will be in a better position than a low 
cash firm to continue to be able to take advantage of investment opportunities and 
generate higher returns for investors.  
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6.0 Conclusion 
________________________________________________________________________ 
In this chapter we present our conclusions to our study. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
This study has two main purposes. The primary purpose is to identify if a link exists 
between excess cash holdings and stock returns applied across boom and bust scenarios 
in a concentrated manner. The secondary purpose is to provide a mapping of relevant 
papers and studies providing a thorough analysis of the topic of cash holdings. This both 
provides a strong base for the analysis and a more informed investor on the topic of cash 
rich firms. 
 
The latter is achieved through rigorous and comprehensive analysis of a plethora of 
documentation on the topic area. Findings provided insight into the five key motives: 
Transactional, Precautionary, Speculative, Tax and Agency. The empirical papers 
provided assessment on these motives and these were mapped to gain a picture of the 
research area. This research provides an informative base for investors and provided a 
sound base from which to build the empirical analysis. 
 
The regression analysis provided a quality measure of excess cash. Through the results of 
the regression applied across our sample of 2287 companies we were able to construct a 
multitude of portfolios to address the primary purpose of the paper. 
 
The empirical analysis of this paper documents an overall positive relationship between 
excess cash holdings and stock returns. In regards to the specific period this paper 
documents a negative relationship in boom times and a positive relationship in times of 
downturn. These findings support the use of a precautionary and/or speculative motive 
for excess cash holdings. From the shareholder perspective, over the long term, more 
value is obtained from investing in high cash firms. 
 
6.1 Further Research 
Due to the positive relationship of excess cash holdings to returns a further investigation 
could be conducted on if it would be possible to optimise the investment portfolios 
utilising a corporate governance input. Due to value enhancing benefits of sound 
corporate governance to cash rich firms (discussed in section 2.2.2) it is conceivable that 
through the addition of a corporate governance input portfolio quality and therefore 
returns may be able to be enhanced. 
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